Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the Strategic Sequencing of Bilateral Negotiations by Silvana Krasteva & Huseyin Yildirim
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904401
Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the  
Strategic Sequencing of Bilateral Negotiations 
 
 
         
 








July 20, 2011 
 
 
ERID Working Paper Number 108 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 







Texas A&M University  Duke University Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904401
Payoﬀ Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the Strategic















This paper investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers
of two complementary objects with uncertain payoﬀs. We show that the sequencing matters
to the buyer only when equilibrium trade can be ineﬃcient. In this case, the buyer begins
with the less powerful seller if the sellers have suﬃciently diverse bargaining powers. If,
however, both sellers are strong bargainers, then the buyer begins with the stronger of the
two. For either choice, the buyer’s sequencing (weakly) increases the social surplus. Our
analysis further reveals that it is sometimes optimal for the buyer to raise her own cost
of acquisition to better manage the supplier competition. As such, we ﬁnd that the buyer
may commit to paying the sellers a minimum price strictly above the marginal cost; and
that the buyer may outsource an input even though it can be made in-house. Finally, we
identify the ﬁrst- and second-mover advantages in negotiations for the sellers.
JEL Classiﬁcations: C70, L23.
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1 Introduction
In a variety of bargaining settings, a buyer sequentially negotiates with the sellers of com-
plementary objects. Examples include a shopping mall developer negotiating with several
landowners to assemble parcels of land; academic departments trying to recruit multiple faculty
members with complementary skills; a vaccine manufacturer bargaining with patent holders
of various antigens; and a home-owner dealing with multiple contractors for complementary
parts of a large project.1
With sequential negotiations, a key strategic choice for the buyer is the sequence itself
because the sellers are likely to price objects diﬀerently depending on the order. In this paper,
we investigate this sequencing choice by the buyer and its social eﬃciency consequences. While
doing so, we also discover that the buyer may sometimes be better oﬀ weakening her bargaining
power against the sellers. In particular, we identify an incentive for the buyer to raise her own
cost of acquiring goods to better manage the supplier competition.
Our model consists of two sellers who own complementary objects and a buyer with unit
demands. While the buyer’s joint valuation is commonly known, her stand-alone valuations
are each independently drawn from a binary distribution.2 In each buyer-seller negotiation,
one player makes a price oﬀer with a pre-speciﬁed probability that reﬂects his/her relative
bargaining power. After receiving both price oﬀers and ascertaining all her valuations in the
process, the buyer decides ex post which objects to purchase.3
For a ﬁxed sequence, there is a unique (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium in our negotiation
game. In the special case of no payoﬀ uncertainty, we show that the buyer is completely
1Although, for concreteness, our examples will mostly relate to procurements, similar sequencing issues
also arise in other contexts such as international negotiations where one central country aims to sign bilateral
trade agreements with others, or build a coalition for an international mission (Sebenius 1996), and political
vote-buying where an interest group tries to secure endorsements of several legislators (Groseclose and Snyder
1996).
2In particular, we assume that the buyer’s stand-alone payoﬀs are (at least initially) more uncertain than her
joint payoﬀ. For example, a developer may be more uncertain about the proﬁtability of a smaller shopping mall
built on a subset of targeted parcels; an academic department may be more uncertain about the stand-alone
contributions of faculty candidates than their joint contributions to the department; a vaccine manufacturer
may be more uncertain about the eﬀectiveness of the vaccine that uses only a subset of the antigens; and a
home-owner may be more uncertain about the use of a backyard porch without landscaping than with it. It is,
however, conceivable that the buyer will resolve her payoﬀ uncertainty as she meets with the sellers and learn
about the objects.
3An ex post purchasing decision guarantees that the buyer does not incur a loss, and this assumption makes
most sense if the buyer is credit-constrained by the value of the project. For instance, in land acquisitions, it is
a common practice to secure an option on the property at a nominal fee, that speciﬁes a price and expiration
date (Poorvu 1999, pp. 151-3).
2indiﬀerent to the sequence because the sellers perfectly coordinate their prices in equilibrium,
resulting in an eﬃcient trade.4 With a suﬃcient payoﬀ uncertainty, however, equilibrium trade
can be ineﬃcient. In such cases, we show that the buyer optimally begins with the weak seller
if one seller is weak and the other is a strong bargainer. If, on the other hand, both sellers
are strong bargainers, then the buyer begins with the stronger of the two. To understand
these observations, note that the buyer –not surprisingly– proposes to pay only the marginal
cost in each negotiation. Thus, the leading seller prices aggressively, if he is followed by a
weak seller who is unlikely to propose against the buyer and capture any surplus. To curb
this behavior, the buyer begins with the weak seller. When both sellers are strong bargainers,
the buyer’s concern for aggressive pricing shifts to the last seller. By leaving the weaker seller
of the two to be the last, the buyer minimizes the likelihood of a high price response in the
second negotiation in the event that the ﬁrst one ends in her favor. In either case, we show
that the buyer’s sequencing (weakly) improves the social surplus.
An interesting implication of our bargaining analysis is that the buyer is sometimes strictly
better oﬀ dealing with the sellers who have higher bargaining powers. The reason is that such
sellers anticipate the other to be more demanding against the buyer and become more concerned
about price coordination, leading them to lower prices. Put diﬀerently, the buyer can sometimes
enhance her bargaining position by becoming weaker vis-` a-vis the sellers. This ﬁnding has two
important implications for procurement policies. First, the buyer may optimally adopt a
minimum purchase price by which she commits to paying the sellers a price strictly above
their marginal costs even when she makes the oﬀers; and second, the buyer who can internally
provide an input at the same cost as the outside seller may, nonetheless, choose to outsource
it. Under each policy, the buyer weakens her bargaining power by raising her own cost of
acquiring the goods in order to better manage the supplier competition.5
We also examine the sellers’ preference for the negotiation sequence, as this may inform us
of their incentives to actively solicit the buyer’s business and even bid for the right to negotiate
at the desired order. Although the standard IO theory establishes a ﬁrst-mover advantage for
price-setting duopolists selling complementary goods (e.g., Gal-Or 1985, and Dowrick 1986), a
second-mover advantage also emerges in our model with a powerful buyer. The reason is that
a powerful buyer is highly likely to secure a low price from the ﬁrst negotiation, which leaves
4Given complementarity, it is socially eﬃcient for the buyer to purchase both units in our model.
5This is a reminiscent of, but quite distinct from, the “handicapping” principle in procurement auctions
where the buyer commits to purchasing a single good from the high-cost supplier at times to induce a more
intense supplier competition (e.g., McAfee and McMillan 1989, and Lewis and Yildirim 2002).
3a large surplus to the second negotiation.
Related Literature. Our paper belongs to a growing literature on one-to-many bargain-
ing, and complements several papers that address the issue of optimal bargaining sequence
without payoﬀ uncertainty. Among them, Marx and Shaﬀer (2007) show that with contingent
contracts, the buyer strictly prefers to negotiate ﬁrst with the weaker seller in order to extract
rents from the stronger one. Absent contingent contracts (as with our model), however, the
buyer would be indiﬀerent to the sequence in their setting. Xiao (2010) studies a complemen-
tary good setting with noncontingent contracts but with a pay-as-you-go scheme. Like Marx
and Shaﬀer, he too ﬁnds that the buyer is better oﬀ starting with the weaker seller, though only
to alleviate a “holdup” problem due to sunk payments for prior purchases. Such a problem
does not arise in our setting because the buyer decides on purchases after receiving all the price
oﬀers. Li (2010) studies an inﬁnite-horizon random-proposer model of complementary goods.
Given no payoﬀ uncertainty, he shows that any sequencing is sustainable in equilibrium.6 In
contrast, our model yields a unique equilibrium, and a strict sequencing preference. In two
related papers, Krasteva and Yildirim (2010), and Noe and Wang (2004) compare public and
private negotiations, and note that the buyer is indiﬀerent to the sequence under both types of
negotiations, though she may strictly randomize. We abstract from privacy concerns here, and
show that with demand uncertainty, the buyer has a strict preference over the sequence.7 In a
labor union-multiple ﬁrm framework, Marshall and Merlo (2004) examine the sequencing issue
using “pattern bargaining” where the buyer uses the contract agreed upon in the ﬁrst negoti-
ation as a starting point of the second negotiation.8 In their case with non-pattern sequential
negotiations, the buyer does not, however, care about the sequence. A similar indiﬀerence
result is obtained by Moresi et al. (2010) in a fairly general model of bilateral negotiations.
Without payoﬀ uncertainty, our model would also result in the buyer’s indiﬀerence to the
sequence, which we further discuss below.
Our paper is also related to models of endogenous sequencing through sellers’ bidding for
positions, e.g., Arbatskaya (2007), and Marx and Shaﬀer (2010). While these papers uncover
either a ﬁrst- or second-mover advantage for the sellers, our setting features the presence of
both advantages depending on the degree of payoﬀ uncertainty and the buyer’s bargaining
6Both Li (2010) and Xiao (2010) build on Cai (2000) who assume homogenous sellers. See also Horn and
Wolinsky (1988), and Stole and Zwiebel (1996) who assume a ﬁxed order of negotiations.
7Note that this is not a simple “puriﬁcation” argument for mixed strategies, because, under the present setup,
Krasteva and Yildirim (2010) would imply that without any uncertainty, the ordering issue is inconsequential
under both public and private negotiations.
8See also Banerji (2002).
4power, even though goods are complements at all realizations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in the next section,
and then fully characterize the equilibrium prices in Section 3. In Section 4, we address the
buyer’s optimal sequencing choice. In Section 5, we show that the buyer’s expected payoﬀ may
decrease with her own bargaining power and examine the two procurement policies alluded
to above. In Section 6, we investigate the ﬁrst- and second-mover advantages for the sellers,
followed by concluding remarks in Section 7. The proofs of all formal results are relegated to
an appendix.
2 The Model
There are three risk-neutral parties: one buyer (b) and two sellers (si, i = 1,2). Each seller
costlessly provides a complementary good for which the buyer has a unit demand. It is com-
monly known at the outset that the buyer possesses a joint value normalized to 1, while her
stand-alone value for good i, vi, is an independent draw from a Bernoulli distribution where
Pr{vi = 0} = qi ∈ [0,1] and Pr{vi = 1
2} = 1 − qi.9 In particular, with probability q1q2, she
views goods to be perfect complements, whereas, with probability (1 − q1)(1 − q2), she views
them to be unrelated. We assume that the buyer privately learns vi as she meets with seller i
to negotiate.10
The buyer negotiates with the sellers sequentially and only once. The price for good i is
determined between the buyer and seller i through a one-shot random-proposer bargaining.
Let σi ∈ {b,si} denote the player who makes the oﬀer such that σi = si with probability
αi ∈ (0,1), and σi = b with probability 1 − αi, where αi measures seller i’s bargaining power
relative to the buyer’s.11 We assume that σ1 and σ2 are independently distributed, and the
realization of σi is observed only by the buyer and seller i during their negotiation.
The timing and information structure of our negotiation game unfolds as described by
Figure 1. First, the buyer publicly chooses the sequence, s1 → s2 or s2 → s1. Next, the
9Our qualitative results remain unchanged by a more general support vL = 0 and vH = v ≤
1
2, leading us to
set v =
1
2 in the text to ease exposition. See Appendix B for details.
10In this regard, we have in mind environments in which information is too costly for the buyer to acquire
independently. For instance, an employer often has to interview a job candidate to determine the match value; a
home-owner frequently needs to consult with a contractor for a customized project; and a real-estate developer
may require access to the construction history of a land parcel from the landowner.
11For instance, αi may proxy a seller’s likelihood of having other customers at the time or his urgent need for
cash; and a landowner’s likelihood of having an alternative use for his land. It is also conceivable that αi may
simply reﬂect the intrinsic bargaining ability of the seller vis-` a-vis the buyer.
5Buyer (b) chooses
the sequence:




















Figure 1: Timing and Information Structure
buyer approaches the ﬁrst seller in the sequence, say si, and privately observes her valuation
vi. Then, the buyer and si bargain over the price of product i, denoted by pi. The buyer, then,
proceeds to sj. She privately learns vj while sj learns pi. Subsequently, the buyer bargains
with sj over pj. Having obtained the two prices pi and pj, and ascertained her valuations vi
and vj, the buyer decides which goods to purchase (if any). Our solution concept is perfect
Bayesian equilibrium throughout.
Note that given the complementarity, trade is (socially) eﬃcient if and only if the buyer
acquires both goods with probability 1. Thus, we call any equilibrium ineﬃcient if it involves
less than joint purchase with a positive probability. In case of indiﬀerence, we assume that
all players break ties in favor of eﬃciency, i.e., purchasing and selling more units. Before
proceeding to the analysis, we brieﬂy discuss some of the modeling assumptions.
2.1 Discussion of the Assumptions
We keep each buyer-seller bargaining simple to better focus on sequencing; nevertheless, our
one-shot bargaining can be a good approximation of applications in which the buyer has a
short time to acquire the goods, or else the trade opportunity is lost.12 Such take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer bargaining has also been used extensively in other bilateral contracting models, e.g., Marx
and Shaﬀer (2007), Noe and Wang (2004), and Segal (1999). Next, our assumption that the
second seller, sj, observes pi can be justiﬁed in two ways. First, if procurement is performed on
behalf of the government, the buyer in many countries will be subject to “sunshine” laws that
typically enable the public to have access to transaction records and even to actual negotiation
meetings (e.g., Berg et al. , pp. 42-44). Second, if it were up to the buyer to disclose such price
information, it is readily veriﬁed that she would have an incentive to disclose a high pi so as to
induce price accommodation by sj. But, such a “monotonic” incentive would then lead to the
12For instance, for many customized goods and services such as home re-modeling and landscaping, contractors
give a free (binding) price estimate to which the customer needs to respond in a short-time period.
6full disclosure of pi, much like in the literature on signaling a veriﬁable quality, e.g., Grossman
(1981). Thus, the important assumption in this regard is that pi information is hard, i.e., the
buyer cannot forge it; but this seems reasonable in many procurement settings – if not most
– as price quotes are often provided in the form of a written contract. Perhaps, what is more
important is that sellers know the sequence. In this respect, we envision environments where
any meeting between the buyer and sellers is highly visible or publicized, or it can be easily
inferred by the sellers from the calendar time.
We also assume that the buyer makes purchases at the very end, with the full knowledge of
the prices and her valuations. Alternatively, she could make purchases soon after negotiating
with each seller. This latter type of negotiations would clearly result in a holdup problem, as the
second seller in the sequence would ignore any previous payment by the buyer. Hence, under
such pay-as-you-go procurement, it is readily veriﬁed that the sum of the sellers’ equilibrium
prices would always exceed the buyer’s value from the entire project.13 This means that a
buyer who is averse to any loss or who is credit-constrained by the project value will prefer
to make purchases at the very end as in our present setting since it never yields an ex post
negative payoﬀ. Moreover, certain government policies such as the Federal Trade Commission’s
“cooling-oﬀ” rule allow consumers to cancel a contract or return a purchase within a ﬁxed time
period, eﬀectively extending their decision deadline.14
3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium prices for a ﬁxed negotiation sequence. The
following proposition states that the equilibrium always involves pooling by the two types of
the buyer, i.e., vi = 1
2 and vi = 0, as well as an aggressive pricing by the ﬁrst seller in the
sequence.
Proposition 1. Given any negotiation sequence si → sj, there is a unique (perfect Bayesian)
equilibrium. In equilibrium, the buyer always makes a marginal-cost oﬀer, 0, to the
sellers, whereas seller i never makes an oﬀer below 1
2.
It is intuitive that in the last negotiation, the buyer will make a marginal cost oﬀer, 0, to
seller j. She will also make a 0 price oﬀer to seller i whenever her valuation for i is high in
order to maximize her outside option against seller j. Given this incentive, a buyer with low
13See Appendix B for a proof.
14See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/products/pro03.shtm.
7valuation for i pools with a buyer with high valuation, rendering her price for good i to be
uninformative of her valuation vi.
Unlike the buyer, each seller is likely to weigh two options when setting his price: (1) he
can try to coordinate his price with the rival’s to induce a joint purchase, or (2) he can ignore
coordination and set a monopoly price for his product. Proposition 1 states that seller i never
sets a price below 1
2 because any such price will guarantee a joint purchase irrespective of the
second negotiation. Given the buyer’s oﬀer, this implies that seller j can perfectly infer the
identity of the proposer in the ﬁrst negotiation, namely σ∗
i ∈ {b,si}, from the observed price.
Thus, it is without loss of generality to condition seller j’s equilibrium price on σ∗
i.15 Our next
result fully characterizes sellers’ equilibrium prices.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the negotiation sequence is si → sj. In equilibrium,




1 if qi > 1
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2 if qi ≤ 1
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Part (a) simply records seller j’s (monopoly) price response to the buyer’s oﬀer of 0 in the
ﬁrst negotiation: he sets the maximum price of 1 if good i is unlikely to have value by itself
(i.e., vi = 0) and he sets a low price of 1
2 otherwise. Part (b) records sellers’ equilibrium prices
when seller i proposes over product i. Refer to Figure 2. Note that p∗
i(si) ≥ 1
2 as stated in
Proposition 1. Thus, the only way seller i will realize a sale is if the buyer acquires both units.16




i more informative than conditioning on p
∗
i – at least in
the text.




2, the buyer is indiﬀerent between purchasing both
goods and purchasing only good i, as each decision leaves her with no surplus. Recall, however, that we break
ties in favor of social eﬃciency. Moreover, if the goods were strict complements, i.e., v
i <
1



























Figure 2: Sellers’ equilibrium prices (p∗
i(si),p∗
j(sj|si))
This requires a price coordination with seller j. Clearly, if seller j is suﬃciently powerful, seller
i lowers his price to induce coordination; otherwise, seller i ignores the coordination problem
and charges the full price of 1 (inside the triangle region in Figure 2). Note also that as the
likelihood of having a low-value product j, qj, increases, seller j’s price decreases; but seller i’s
price is increasing in qj only when αj is large due to the coordination incentive. Otherwise,
when αj is small, seller i ’s price is non-monotone in qj, reaching its maximum for some
intermediate level of qj that eliminates the coordination incentive.
Armed with the equilibrium characterization, we now investigate the buyer’s sequencing
choice.
4 Strategic Sequencing
A key observation from Proposition 2 is that for a ﬁxed sequence of negotiations, the sellers’
bargaining powers and the buyer’s payoﬀ uncertainty each inﬂuence equilibrium prices. The
buyer can also inﬂuence these prices by strategically sequencing the sellers. To establish a
benchmark, we ﬁrst note that the sequencing is inconsequential to the buyer if an eﬃcient
trade is obtained.
9Proposition 3. (Eﬃciency) Equilibrium trade is eﬃcient irrespective of the sequence if
and only if qi / ∈ (1
2,1), or equivalently   α(qi) = 0, for i = 1,2. In addition, if qi / ∈ (1
2,1)
for i = 1,2, then the buyer is indiﬀerent to the sequencing.
Recall that given the complementarity, eﬃcient trade occurs whenever both goods are
acquired with probability 1. In the absence of payoﬀ uncertainty, i.e., qi ∈ {0,1}, it is intuitive
that the sellers will perfectly coordinate their prices in equilibrium and induce a joint purchase
irrespective of who makes the oﬀer in each negotiation. This is also true when goods are
suﬃciently weak complements, namely qi ≤ 1
2, because equilibrium prices still stay at their low
level, 1
2. Since, under an eﬃcient trade, the extra surplus due to complementarity is captured
by the sellers unless the buyer proposes in both negotiations, the buyer is indiﬀerent to the
sequence.17
Proposition 3 implies that the sequencing matters to the buyer only if the equilibrium trade
is ineﬃcient for at least one sequencing choice.18 It also implies that the payoﬀ uncertainty
is the main source of ineﬃciency in our model. Our next ﬁnding uncovers how the buyer’s
sequencing choice depends on the sellers’ bargaining powers.
Proposition 4. (Bargaining Powers) Let qi = q ∈ (1





is indiﬀerent to the sequence if α1 < α2 <   α(q)
strictly prefers the sequence s1 → s2 if α1 <   α(q) ≤ α2
strictly prefers the sequence s2 → s1 if   α(q) ≤ α1 < α2;
(b) the buyer’s sequencing choice (weakly) improves ex ante social surplus.
According to part (a), when goods are strong but imperfect complements, the buyer is
indiﬀerent to the sequence if both sellers are weak bargainers, i.e., α1 < α2 <   α(q). This
indiﬀerence, however, is not due to eﬃcient trade; rather switching the order would not alter
the sellers’ pricing behavior. In particular, the leading seller would set a noncoordinating
price of 1 given that the follower is unlikely to make an oﬀer against the buyer. This implies
that if the buyer could increase the leading seller’s concern for price coordination by switching
17It is readily veriﬁed that, regardless of the sequence, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ in this case is π(b) =
(1 − α1)(1 − α2) + α1(1 − α2)v
2 + α2(1 − α1)v
1.
18We believe that this eﬃciency reasoning can explain why sequencing may or may not be nontrivial in other
papers discussed in the Introduction.
10the order, she would choose to do so. This is possible if the sellers’ bargaining powers are
suﬃciently diverse in the sense that α1 <   α(q) ≤ α2. In this case, the buyer strictly prefers
to start negotiations with seller 1 because, being followed by a strong rival, seller 1 has an
equilibrium incentive to coordinate prices by lowering his own. If, on the other hand, both
sellers are suﬃciently powerful such that   α(q) ≤ α1 < α2, it is optimal for the buyer to start
with seller 2 instead. Notice that with two suﬃciently strong sellers, price coordination occurs
in equilibrium irrespective of the sequence. Hence, the buyer’s objective in this case is to
prevent an aggressive price response in the second negotiation in the event that she receives a
favorable oﬀer in the ﬁrst.19 According to part (b), even though the buyer is not maximizing
the social surplus per se, her sequencing choice (weakly) increases it. This observation is also
consistent with Proposition 3 above: since the maximum social surplus is obtained irrespective
of the sequence, the buyer is indiﬀerent to the sequence.
In light of Proposition 4, it is worth noting that unlike the papers discussed in the In-
troduction, our model with a simple payoﬀ uncertainty breaks the buyer’s indiﬀerence to the
sequence, and more importantly, shows that the optimal sequencing varies with the sellers’
bargaining powers. Our model can further inform us about the sequencing decision when the
buyer faces diﬀerent levels of uncertainty about the objects’ valuations.
Proposition 5. (Payoﬀ Uncertainty) Suppose that αi = α, and that q1 / ∈ (1
2,1) and
q2 ∈ (1
2,1). Then, the buyer strictly prefers to approach seller 1 ﬁrst if α ≥   α(q2), but
she is indiﬀerent to the order if α <   α(q2).
Proposition 5 indicates that the buyer will begin negotiations with the (stochastically)
higher value seller if the sellers are suﬃciently powerful. To see why, note that the leading seller
always charges a price greater than the buyer’s stand-alone value, and that with suﬃciently
powerful sellers, the buyer is likely to purchase only one good, namely that of the last seller.
To ensure the lowest price by the last seller, the buyer ﬁrst visits the high value seller 1 whose
high price induces low coordinating price by seller 2.20
19Note that concealing a low price of 0 obtained from the ﬁrst negotiation in order to prevent an aggressive
response by the second seller would not work for the buyer. As mentioned earlier, since the buyer has an
incentive to disclose a high price, a nondisclosure will be inferred as being 0 by the second seller.
20For a slightly more formal argument, suppose that α and q2 are both close to 1. If the buyer sequences seller
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2 ) > 0. On the other hand, if the buyer sequences







, leaving (virtually) no surplus to the buyer.
115 Beneﬁts of Being a Weak Buyer
Up to now, two robust insights have emerged from our analysis. First, the buyer cares about the
negotiation sequence when equilibrium trade is ineﬃcient and at least one seller is a powerful
bargainer. Second, to the extent that he is followed by a powerful rival, the leading seller will
care about price coordination and reduce his price. These insights raise the following question:
would the buyer ever prefer sellers with greater bargaining powers, or equivalently would the
buyer ever prefer to be in a weaker bargaining position against the sellers? The answer to this
question can indeed be aﬃrmative.
Proposition 6. (Being a Weak Buyer) Suppose qi = q, and that αL = (α1,αL
2) and
αH = (α1,αH
2 ) are two bargaining power proﬁles where αL
2 < αH
2 .
(a) For q ∈ (1
2,1), let α1  =   α(q), αL
2 =   α(q) − ∆, and αH
2 =   α(q) + ∆. Then, there is
some ∆ > 0 such that the buyer is strictly better oﬀ under αH than under αL for all
∆ ∈ (0,∆).
(b) For q / ∈ (1
2,1), the buyer is strictly worse oﬀ under αH than under αL.
Part (a) follows from Proposition 4. When goods are strong but imperfect complements,
equilibrium trade is ineﬃcient, which means that there is room for improving social surplus by
strategically sequencing the sellers. The buyer can, however, increase the surplus and claim
a portion of this increase only if the sellers soften their pricing behaviors. As argued above,
this is possible when the leading seller is followed by a suﬃciently powerful rival who will be
demanding against the buyer. Thus, while, for ﬁxed prices, powerful sellers will have a negative
direct eﬀect on the buyer’s payoﬀ, they may also have a positive strategic eﬀect on her payoﬀ
through pricing. Part (a) demonstrates that when the sellers’ bargaining powers are not too
high, the strategic eﬀect dominates. That is, the buyer may prefer to be in a weaker bargaining
position against the sellers.





faced with the sellers whose bargaining powers are α1 and αL
2 =   α(q) − ∆, Proposition 4
implies that the buyer is indiﬀerent to the sequence, because both sellers are weak and they
price aggressively regardless of the sequence. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the
buyer bargains with seller 1 ﬁrst in this case. Then, from Proposition 2, equilibrium prices are
(p∗
1(s1),p∗
2(s2|s1)) = (1, 1
2) and p∗
2(s2|b) = 1. Conditioning on each possible realization of the
12proposers, the buyer’s ex ante payoﬀ is found to be:
π(b|αL) = (1 − α1)(1 − αL









On the other hand, when faced with the sellers whose bargaining powers are α1 and αH
2 =






2(s2|b) = 1. Using these prices, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ
is found to be:
π(b|αH) = (1 − α1)(1 − αH




+ (1 − α1)αH




Comparing (4) and (5), it follows that π(b|αL) < π(b|αH) for all ∆ ∈ (0, α1
4+2q(2−3α1)). That
is, given α1 <   α(q), the buyer strictly prefers to deal with seller 2 whose bargaining power is
αH
2 =   α(q) + ∆ rather than αL
2 =   α(q) − ∆ so long as ∆ is small.
Part (b) of Proposition 6 simply says that when equilibrium trade is eﬃcient, the buyer
wants to be in a stronger bargaining position against the sellers. In this case, sequencing does
not improve the social surplus or generate a positive strategic eﬀect on the buyer’s payoﬀ.
Proposition 6 implies that it may sometimes be in the buyer’s best interest to limit her own
bargaining power vis-` a-vis the sellers. If this power comes from forming buyer alliances and
cooperatives, our result says that there may be strategic reasons for the buyer to cap the size
of the alliance. Our prediction for the adverse eﬀect of the “buyer power” on the buyer herself
is consistent with those in the literature, e.g., Chipty and Snyder (1999), Horn and Wolinsky
(1988), and Inderst and Wey (2003), though our reasoning is quite diﬀerent.21 By focusing
on eﬃcient bilateral negotiations (often through using the Nash Bargaining Solution), these
papers show that increased buyer power through mergers is not necessarily beneﬁcial to the
buyer, and its beneﬁt crucially depends on the curvature of the value created by the mergers.
In contrast, our comparative static result in part (a) underlines the impact of buyer power on
the potential for ineﬃcient bargaining with the suppliers while keeping the surplus ﬁxed. In
fact, when bargaining is always eﬃcient, part (b) of Proposition 6 reveals that the buyer is
always better oﬀ having more power.
Proposition 6 also has other important implications for organizational procurement policies,
and we next address two such policies.
21There is a relatively vast literature on buyer power, which is ably surveyed by Inderst and Mazzarotto
(2009). Consistent with our model, these authors deﬁne buyer power as “the bargaining strength that a buyer
has with respect to the suppliers with whom it trades.”
135.1 Minimum Purchase Price
One reason why the sellers may price aggressively in our model is that in equilibrium, the buyer
always makes the lowest price oﬀer, namely the marginal-cost, 0. While this is the buyer’s
optimal choice whenever she proposes, it also leaves a large surplus for the sellers to claim. In
particular, it may entice the leading seller to disregard price coordination with the follower and
target the buyer’s entire surplus of 1 instead. The next proposition shows that the buyer can
partially control this aggressive behavior by the leader and secure more of the surplus herself
by committing to paying a positive price.
Proposition 7. (Being a Generous Buyer) Let qi = q and αi = α. Suppose that prior
to negotiations, the buyer commits to paying at least w ≥ 0 for each unit she purchases.
Then,
(a) for q ∈ (1
2,1), there exists α ∈ (0,   α(q)) such that the buyer optimally sets w > 0 for all
α ∈ [α,   α(q)).
(b) for q / ∈ (1
2,1), the buyer optimally sets w = 0 for all α.
Part (a) of Proposition 7 indicates that for strong but imperfect complements, it may be in
the buyer’s best interest to commit to paying a positive price even when she makes the oﬀers.
Consistent with Proposition 6, the buyer intentionally weakens her bargaining position through
a minimum payment to better manage the competition between the sellers. It is evident that
any positive payment by the buyer will allow the sellers to earn positive proﬁts regardless of
who makes the oﬀer while reducing the buyer’s own payoﬀ. Thus, to be beneﬁcial to the buyer,
any such payment must change the sellers’ strategic pricing in the buyer’s favor. This is most
easily seen with the weak sellers who, as explained before, tend to price aggressively. When the
buyer commits to paying at least w > 0 per unit, each seller knows that the maximum surplus
is 1 − w instead of 1. This reduced surplus makes a non-coordinating pricing strategy by the
leading seller less attractive, and for an optimally set w > 0, it may lead to a coordinating
equilibrium in which supply prices are more moderate. Note that an upfront commitment to
w > 0 is crucial here, because, once the leading seller lowers his price oﬀer, the buyer has a
strict incentive to lower her oﬀer to 0 in the second negotiation whenever she proposes.
Part (b) of Proposition 7 is also in line with Proposition 6: when equilibrium trade is
eﬃcient irrespective of the sequence, there is no strategic value of a positive purchase price,
and hence it is optimally set to be 0.
14It is worth noting that a positive price oﬀer is optimal for a powerful buyer given that
  α(q) < 0.19. Hence, our result in part (a) might suggest that even without quality or ethical
concerns, participating in a “fair trade” agreement that sets a minimum negotiation price can
be in the best interest of powerful buyers.22 In the same vein, large employers might favor
minimum wage regulations when hiring new employees.
5.2 The Make-or-Buy Decision
A critical decision for many industrial buyers is whether to make inputs internally or outsource
them from independent suppliers. Conventional wisdom suggests that an input should be made
in-house if its internal cost of production is less than the price charged by the outside supplier.
This simple criterion would apply if a single input were required for a ﬁnal product.23 However,
if two complementary inputs are required, as in the present setting, the following result shows
that the buyer may optimally outsource an input even if it could be costlessly provided in-
house.
Proposition 8 (Outsourcing). Suppose that the buyer can costlessly make input 1 in-house,
which has no stand-alone value, q1 = 1. Also, suppose that αi = α. Then, the buyer is
strictly better oﬀ outsourcing both inputs than only input 2 if q2 >
√
5−1




Proposition 8 says that when inputs are strong complements and suppliers are powerful
bargainers, the “naive” decision of making the zero-cost input in-house while outsourcing the
other cannot be optimal for the buyer. In particular, it is strictly better for the buyer to
outsource both inputs in this case. The reason is twofold. First, given the high degree of
complementarity, the surplus generated by the internal production of input 1 at zero cost is
likely to be shared with supplier 2 at the negotiation. Second, we know from Proposition 1 that
two powerful suppliers would have the greatest incentives to coordinate and lower their prices.
To interpret this result slightly diﬀerently, note that for the buyer, internally producing input
1 is equivalent to outsourcing the same input but having all the bargaining power vis-` a-vis
supplier 1. Proposition 6, however, has informed us that the buyer may sometimes prefer to
be in a weaker bargaining position against the sellers, or in this case, outsource input 1 rather
than make it in-house.
22According to the Fairtrade Foundation of the UK, the minimum price set by the Fairtrade Labelling Orga-
nizations International “...is not a ﬁxed price, but should be seen as the lowest possible starting point for price
negotiations between producer and purchaser.” See www.fairtrade.org.uk.
23The make-or-buy decision can, of course, be complicated by various other factors that we ignore here such
as asset speciﬁcity and incomplete contracts (see, e.g., Williamson (2005) for a recent survey).
15Two observations are in order. First, when goods are strong complements and suppliers are
powerful bargainers, Proposition 8 implies that the buyer is likely to follow an all-or-nothing
sourcing strategy. The optimal decision will, however, depend on suppliers’ bargaining powers,
complementarity, and the total internal cost of production.24Second, our ﬁnding that the buyer
may outsource even without a cost disadvantage complements other strategic explanations for
the same phenomenon. For instance, Arya, Mittendorf, and Sappington (2008) have demon-
strated that a retail competitor may pay a premium to outsource production to a common
supplier in order to raise its rivals’ costs through unfavorable supply deals. In contrast, in
our model, a single ﬁrm outsources production to raise its own cost for an input to receive a
favorable deal from the other supplier of a complementary input.
6 First- vs. Second-Mover Advantages for Sellers
So far we have focused on the buyer’s preference over the negotiation sequence since she is the
central agent who initiates the negotiations. It is, however, conceivable that the sellers will
also have a preference. In particular, if, all else equal, the sellers expect a higher proﬁt from
being the ﬁrst to negotiate with the buyer than being the second, then they may actively solicit
the buyer’s business by oﬀering a discount for the right to be the ﬁrst. If, on the other hand,
the sellers expect a greater proﬁt from being the second to negotiate, then no such solicitation
should take place. Let πl(si) and πf(si) denote seller i’s expected proﬁts from being the leader
or the follower in the negotiations, respectively. Then, we have
Proposition 9 (First- and Second-Mover Advantages). Let q1 = q2 = q and α1 =
α2 = α. Then,
πl(si) − πf(si)

   
   
= 0 if q ≤ 1
2
< 0 if 1




< 0 if q >
√
5−1
2 and α <
2−q−q2
1+q
> 0 if q >
√
5−1
2 and α >
2−q−q2
1+q .
According to Proposition 9, there is a ﬁrst-mover advantage if the sellers are strong bar-
gainers and goods are likely to be perfect complements. Otherwise, there is a second-mover
24Note that we intentionally assumed in Proposition 8 that the cost of producing input 1 is zero; but the
internal cost of both inputs can be some K ≥ 0, leaving a surplus of 1−K in case of an all in-house production.
16advantage, except for when trade is eﬃcient, i.e., q ≤ 1
2, in which case no ﬁrst- or second-
mover advantage exists. Consider, for instance, the case of perfect complements, q = 1. From
Proposition 1, we know that with perfect complements, the leading seller sets the most aggres-
sive price of 1 because he knows that the follower will have to accommodate by a price of 0,




2 , there is still a ﬁrst-mover advantage if the leader makes the oﬀer with a suﬃciently
high probability. Otherwise, there will be a second-mover advantage since the follower can then
have a signiﬁcant chance to claim the buyer’s entire surplus if the buyer ends up proposing in
the ﬁrst negotiation.
It is worth comparing our observations from Proposition 9 with those from the standard
duopoly theory in which the sellers are price-setters, i.e, α → 1. For complementary products,
the IO literature has established the presence of a ﬁrst-mover advantage for duopolists (e.g.,
Gal-Or 1985, and Dowrick 1986). This is in line with our result when q >
√
5−1
2 . However, a
switch to the second-mover advantage occurs in our model as the buyer becomes more powerful
so that she is no longer a price-taker. The second-mover advantage also arises in our model




2 ] because the second seller can charge a (weakly) higher price than the
ﬁrst.25
7 Concluding Remarks
Unlike the standard consumer theory, the buyer is not a simple price-taker in many real
examples; rather she is a powerful agent who actively negotiates the price with the sellers. The
negotiations grow complicated when there are multiple sellers, because it is often infeasible
for all interested parties to meet. In such situations, a key strategic decision for the buyer
is how to sequence the bilateral negotiations. In this paper, we have focused on the sellers
of complementary goods, and included the possibility that the buyer can be uncertain of her
valuations. Our ﬁrst set of results have revealed that to the extent that equilibrium trade is
eﬃcient, the buyer will be neutral to the sequence. We believe that this eﬃciency reasoning
is also the driving force behind the similar “indiﬀerence” ﬁndings in the literature. When
equilibrium trade is ineﬃcient (due to the uncertainty in our model), however, the buyer can
25There is an extensive IO literature identifying a second-mover advantage by enriching the standard duopoly
model. Most related to our work are the papers with demand uncertainty where the strategic action of the
leader has a signaling value, which is not the case in ours. See, e.g., Daughety and Reinganum (1994), Gal-Or
(1987), and Mailath (1987).
17have a strict preference over the sequence, depending, e.g., on the sellers’ bargaining powers.
Our second set of results have revealed that the buyer may sometimes raise her own cost
of acquisition to better manage the suppliers’ competition. In particular, with complementary
goods, securing a low price in one negotiation leaves a large surplus to the seller in the other,
encouraging him to be more demanding. To restrain this behavior, we ﬁnd that the buyer
may commit to giving up some of her surplus up front to obtain more favorable prices later.
This commitment can manifest itself in the form of a procurement policy such as a minimum
purchase price or the outsourcing of an input when it can be made in-house at the same cost.
At the core of our investigation lies the assumption that the buyer can be uncertain of her
valuations. While this ﬁts well with the applications in which it is prohibitively costly for the
buyer to discover all her valuations without meeting with the sellers, the cost of information can
be low in other applications. For instance, with the recent advent of the internet, an employer
may ﬁnd out much more easily about job candidates through their websites before scheduling
a meeting. In such cases, it would be interesting to determine the buyer’s incentive to invest
in this information prior to negotiations given that her sequencing choice can (partially) signal
her valuations to the sellers. Another assumption we have maintained throughout is that goods
are complementary. We have done this intentionally here to focus our analysis since the case
of substitutes appears to have some qualitative diﬀerences that deserve separate investigation.
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Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the buyer
negotiates with si ﬁrst, and that pi is the resulting price. When negotiating with sj, it is
clear that the buyer proposes Pj(b|pi) = 0 regardless of pi. To derive sj’s best price response,
Pj(sj|pi), let qi denote sj’s belief that vi = 0 conditional on pi. Note that for any pi, sj realizes
a sale if and only if
max{1 − pi − Pj(sj|pi),vj − Pj(sj|pi)} ≥ max{vi − pi,0}.
We exhaust two possibilities for pi. If pi ≤ 1
2, then max{1−pi−Pj(sj|pi),vj −Pj(sj|pi)} =
1−pi−Pj(sj|pi). Thus, given the two possible realizations of vi, sj can either charge a price of
1−pi, selling his good only when vi = 0, or charge a price of 1
2, selling his good with certainty.
Comparing his respective payoﬀs, ¯ qi(1 − pi) and 1
2, from these two pricing options, it follows
that Pj(sj|pi) = 1 − pi if pi < 1 − 1
2qi, and Pj(sj|pi) = 1
2 if 1 − 1
2qi ≤ pi ≤ 1
2. Next, consider
pi > 1
2. Then, since vi ≤ 1
2, good i is purchased only if the buyer acquires both units. Given
this, sj can either set a coordinating price of 1 − pi and sell his unit with certainty, or he can
set a price of 1
2 and sell only his own unit when vj = 1
2. Comparing the respective payoﬀs,
1 − pi and (1 − qj)1
2, it follows that Pj(sj|pi) = 1 − pi if 1
2 < pi ≤
1+qj




2 . To summarize,
Pj(sj|pi) =

   
   
1 − pi if 0 ≤ pi < 1 − 1
2qi
1
2 if 1 − 1
2qi ≤ pi ≤ 1
2
1 − pi if 1








Turning to the ﬁrst negotiation, note that the buyer would never oﬀer pi(b) > 1
2; otherwise
she would lose the option of purchasing only good i. A price oﬀer of pi(b) = 1
2 can also be
ruled out since it will allow sj to extract all the buyer’s surplus by charging Pj(sj|1
2) = 1
2.
Note also that the lowest price that si would charge is pi(si) = 1
2 (as claimed in Proposition 1),
because, given that Pj(sj|1
2) = 1
2, this is the highest price that would guarantee a sale. Thus, if
pi ∈ [0, 1
2), then sj would infer that the buyer was the proposer in the ﬁrst negotiation. Next,
we show that pi(b) = 0 for all vi resulting in ¯ qi = qi. Note that for pi ∈ [0, 1
2), pi(b) = 1 − 1
2qi
is suﬃcient to induce the lower price response, namely Pj(sj|pi) = 1
2, so long as 1 − 1
2qi ≥ 0.
If, however, 1 − 1
2qi < 0, then the buyer optimally oﬀers pi(b) = 0 independent of vi. This
means that if qi < 1
2, then ¯ qi = qi. Suppose qi ≥ 1
2. In this case, the expected payoﬀ of the
19buyer with vi = 1
2 is αj[1
2 −pi(b)]+(1−αj)[1−pi(b)], which is clearly maximized at pi(b) = 0.
This implies that the buyer with vi = 0 cannot do any better than setting pi(b) = 0 either,
since pi(b) ∈ (0, 1
2) would reveal her low valuation in equilibrium and result in a response
Pj(sj|pi) = 1 − pi > 1
2. Therefore, in equilibrium, p∗
i(b) = 0 and qi = qi, i.e., sj cannot
learn anything about vi from the buyer’s price oﬀer, as claimed in Proposition 1. Part (a) of
Proposition 2 follows immediately from ¯ qi = qi and p∗
j(sj|b) = Pj(sj|0).
To prove part (b) of Proposition 2, we examine the equilibrium pricing by si. We have
already argued that pi(si) ≥ 1
2. Note that pi(si) =
1+qj




since, by (A-1), Pj(sj|pi) = 1 − pi < 1
2, and si makes a sale with the same probability qj, i.e.,
if vj = 0. Finally, for any price oﬀer in (
1+qj
2 ,1], si makes a sale with the same probability
(1 − αj)qj, i.e., if the buyer is the proposer for good j and vj = 0. This means that pi(si) = 1
is the optimal price for si in the region (
1+qj




2 , and 1, yielding expected payoﬀs, 1
2,
1+qj
2 qj, and (1 − αj)qj, respectively. Deﬁning
  α(qj) as in (3), it is clear that if αj <   α(qj), then p∗
i(si) = 1, resulting in Pj(sj|p∗
i(si)) = 1
2. If,
however, αj ≥   α(qj), then si compares payoﬀs, 1
2 and
1+qj




























Finally, the uniqueness of the equilibrium asserted in Proposition 1 follows by construction.
￿
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that the eﬃcient trade occurs in our model whenever
the buyer purchases both goods with certainty, resulting in expected social surplus, SS = 1.
Suppose that si is approached ﬁrst. Then, the expected equilibrium social surplus is given by
SSij = (1 − αi)(1 − αj) + αi(1 − αj)
 
















































where 1( ) stands for the indicator function. The ﬁrst term for SSij accounts for the possibility
that the buyer is the proposer in both negotiations, in which case she purchases both goods
with certainty at 0 price. The second term accounts for the possibility of si being the proposer
in the ﬁrst negotiation and the buyer in the second. Then, the buyer purchases both goods
20whenever vj = 0 and purchases only good j if vj = 1
2 and p∗
i(si) > 1
2. Similarly, the third term
accounts for the possibility of sj being the proposer in the second negotiation and the buyer in
the ﬁrst. Finally, the last term accounts for the sellers making price oﬀers in each negotiation.
Since p∗
i(si) ≥ 1
2, for vj = 0, the buyer will purchase both goods if the sum of the prices does
not exceed 1. For vj = 1
2, the buyer will opt for purchasing good j only if p∗
i(si) > 1
2. Taking
into account the equilibrium prices derived in Proposition 2, it is straightforward to verify that
SS12 = SS21 = 1 whenever qi / ∈ (1
2,1) for i = 1,2. Otherwise, if qi ∈ (1
2,1) for some i, then
p∗
j(sj|b) = 1 and from equation (A-2) it is straightforward to verify that SS∗
ij < 1. Thus, trade
is eﬃcient independent of the sequence if and only if qi / ∈ (1
2,1) for i = 1,2, or equivalently,
  α(qi) = 0 by Proposition 2.
Consider now the buyer’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ from approaching si ﬁrst.
πij(b) = (1 − αi)(1 − αj) + αi(1 − αj)
 
qj(1 − p∗




















If the buyer is the proposer in both negotiations, captured by the ﬁrst term in equation (A-3),
then she realizes a payoﬀ of 1. If the buyer is a proposer only in the second period, she gets a
payoﬀ of 1 − p∗
i(si) if vj = 0 since then she purchases both goods. If instead, vj = 1
2, she can
ensure a payoﬀ of 1
2. Similarly, the third term accounts for the possibility of sj being a proposer
in the second negotiation and the buyer in the ﬁrst. Finally, if the sellers are proposers in both
negotiations, the buyer can realize a positive payoﬀ only if vj = 1
2 and the second seller charges
a price lower than 1
2 resulting in a payoﬀ of 1
2 − p∗
j(sj|si). It is straightforward to verify that
for qi / ∈ (1
2,1) and i = 1,2 we have π12(b) = π21(b). ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Let q1 = q2 = q ∈ (1
2,1) and α1 < α2. We prove both parts
together. Suppose that α1 < α2 <   α(q). Then, given the equilibrium prices from Proposition
2 and equation (A-3), it follows that π12(b) − π21(b) = 0. Moreover, from equation (A-2),
SS12 − SS21 = 0 in this case.
Next, suppose that α1 <   α(q) ≤ α2. Then, Proposition 2 and equation (A-3) result in
π12(b) − π21(b) = α1(1 − α2)q(1 − p∗
1(s1)) + α1α2(1 − q)[p∗
1(s1) − 1
2] > 0 since p∗
1(s1) ≥ 1
2.
Therefore, the buyer is strictly better oﬀ approaching s1 ﬁrst. Moreover, from equation (A-2),
SS12 − SS21 = α1(1 − α2)1
21(p∗
1(s1) ≤ 1











1). Using equation (A-3), we ﬁnd that π12(b)−π21(b) = (α1−α2)q [1 − p∗
1(s1)] <
0. Thus, the buyer will choose to negotiate with s2 ﬁrst. Moreover, from equation (A-2),
SS12 − SS21 = (α1 − α2)1
21(p∗
1(s1) ≤ 1
2) ≤ 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5. Let α1 = α2 = α and q1 / ∈ (1
2,1) and q2 ∈ (1
2,1). From
Proposition 2,   α(q1) = 0 and   α(q2) > 0. Depending on α, we consider three subcases:




2 ]: Then, by equation (A-3), π12(b) − π21(b) = α(1 − α)
q2
2 > 0.
α ≥   α(q2) and q2 ∈ (
√
5−1
2 ,1): Then, by equation (A-3), π12(b) − π21(b) = α2(1 − q2)
q2
2 > 0.
α <   α(q2): Then, by equation (A-3), π12(b) − π21(b) = 0.
Hence, the buyer strictly prefers to ﬁrst negotiate over product 1 for α ≥   α(q2), and she is
indiﬀerent to the sequence for α <   α(q2). ￿
Proof of Proposition 6.
a) Suppose that qi = q ∈ (1
2,1), and that αL
2 =   α(q)−∆, and αH
2 =   α(q)+∆. We distinguish
two cases for α1:
• α1 <   α(q): From Proposition 4, the buyer is indiﬀerent to the sequence under αL =
(α1,αL
2). Using equilibrium prices in Proposition 2, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is found
to be:
π12(b|αL) = π21(b|αL) = (1 − α1)(1 − αL









– Under αH = (α1,αH
2 ), Proposition 4 implies that the buyer optimally visits s1 ﬁrst.
From Proposition 2 and equation (A-3), we have the following expected payoﬀs.








π12(b|αH) = (1 − α1)(1 − αH




+ (1 − α1)αH




– q ∈ (
√
5−1




































22Clearly, ∆ > 0. Moreover, it is readily veriﬁed that   α(q) − ∆ > 0 and   α(q) + ∆ < 1.
• α1 >   α(q): Under αL, the buyer optimally visits s2 ﬁrst. Suppose that αH
2 < α1, in which
case the buyer optimally visits s1 ﬁrst. Then,





π21(b|αL) = (1 − α1)(1 − αL










π12(b|αH) = (1 − α1)(1 − αH




+ (1 − α1)αH




Comparing the two payoﬀs, it follows that π21(b|αL) < π12(b|αH) for any ∆ ∈ (0,∆),
where ∆ =
q(α1−ˆ α(q))
2+q(1−2α1) > 0. It is easily shown that ˆ α(q) − ∆ > 0 and ˆ α(q) + ∆ < α1.

































Comparing the two payoﬀs, it follows that π21(b|αL) < π12(b|αH) for any ∆ ∈ (0,∆),
where ∆ =
q(1−q)(α1−ˆ α(q))
2+q2+q(1−4α1) > 0, satisfying ˆ α(q) − ∆ > 0 and ˆ α(q) + ∆ < α1.
b) Suppose that qi = q / ∈ (1
2,1). From Proposition 3, we know that the buyer is indiﬀerent
to the negotiation order, and by equation (A-3), her payoﬀ is















1) for q / ∈ (1
2,1) by Proposition 2. Then, simple
algebra shows that the r.h.s. is decreasing in α2, establishing part (b). ￿
Proof of Proposition 7. Let qi = q and αi = α. Suppose that prior to negotiations, the
buyer commits to paying at least w ≥ 0 for each unit she purchases. Also, suppose, without
loss of generality, that the buyer negotiates with si ﬁrst. First we show that w ≥ 1
2 cannot
23optimal for the buyer. Under w ≥ 1
2, the buyer realizes a 0 payoﬀ if she is the proposer in
both negotiations. If she is the proposer only in the ﬁrst negotiation, sj extracts the remaining
surplus by charging Pj(sj|w) =
 
1 − w if 1




2 if w >
1+q
2
. Therefore, the only possible
beneﬁt from committing to w ≥ 1
2 is to induce a lower price by si. The lowest price oﬀered
by si is Pi(si) = 1 − w requiring α1
2 < 1 − w since from equation (A-1) we know that 1
2 is
accepted with certainty if sj is the proposer in the second negotiation. From equation (A-1),
pi(si) = 1 − w results in a price response Pj(sj|1 − w) = w. Thus, the highest possible payoﬀ
for the buyer from setting w ≥ 1
2 is π(b|w ≥ 1
2) = α(1 − α)(1 − q)(w − 1
2) + α2(1 − q)(w − 1
2).
From equation (A-3), it is readily veriﬁed that π(b|w = 0) > α(1 − α)(1 − q) > π(b|w ≥ 1
2) for
all q and α1
2 < 1 − w, establishing that the optimal w < 1
2.
Next, consider w ∈ [0, 1
2). Given (A-1), if si anticipates sj making an oﬀer in the second
negotiation, she will choose between pi(si) ∈ {1
2,
1+q
2 }. If, instead, si anticipates the buyer
making an oﬀer, then si has a chance of realizing a sale by setting pi(si) = 1−w. Thus, si has
three candidates for his optimal price: pi(si) ∈ {1
2,
1+q
2 ,1−w}. While the price of 1
2 is accepted
with certainty, independent of who makes the oﬀer in the second negotiation, the probability
of acceptance of 1−w and
1+q








2 is accepted with probability αq
1+q
2 , and 1 − w is accepted with probability q. We
now consider two regions for q as stated in the proposition.
(a) q ∈ (1
2,1) : Since our goal is to establish the optimality of w > 0, we restrict attention
to w ∈ [0,
1−q
2 ). In this case, pi(si) = 1
2 is accepted with probability 1, pi(si) =
1+q
2 is
accepted with probability q, and pi(si) = 1 − w is accepted with probability (1 − α)q.
Comparing si’s payoﬀ under these prices, we can derive the equilibrium prices (which




1 − w if q > 1
2(1−w)
1









(1 − w, 1



















0 if q ≤ 1
2(1−w)
1 − 1












Note that for w <
1−q
2 , we have q(1−w) > q
1+q





q′′ since q′ solves 1
2 = q′(1−w) and q′′ solves 1
2 = q′′ 1+q′′
2 . Since the equilibrium pricing depends
on q, we consider two subcases:




2 ] : In this case, if α < ˆ α(q,0), the equilibrium will be one of non-coordination.
Let w(α,q) = 1 − 1
2q(1−α) denote the minimum price that induces coordination by the
sellers. Note that w(α,q) <
1−q
2 since q <
√
5−1










j(sj|b) = 1 − w since
q(1 − w) > 1
2. Thus, the buyer’s payoﬀ is
π(b|w = 0) = (1 − α)2 + α(1 − α)(1 − q)
1
2
+ α(1 − α)(1 − q)
1
2
= (1 − α)(1 − qα).
π[b|w ≥ w(α,q)] = (1 − α)2(1 − 2w) + α(1 − α)(
1
2





(1 − α)(2 − qα)(1 − 2w)
2
.
Comparing the two payoﬀs, it follows that π[b|w ≥ w(α,q)] > π(b|w = 0) for w <
αq
2(2−qα).





2(2−qα) is increasing in α and w(α,q) is decreasing in α. Moreover, w(ˆ α(q,0),q) = 0.
Therefore, there exists αc(q) such that for α ∈ (αc(q), ˆ α(q,0)), we have π[b|w = w(α,q)] >
π(b|w = 0).
• q ∈ (
√
5−1











2 ). In addition, p∗
j(sj|b) = 1 − w. Then,






+α(1 − α)(1 − q)(
1
2




25Trivial algebra reveals that π(b|w ≥ w(α,q)) > π(b|w = 0) for w <
α(1−q)q
2(1−α)(2−qα). Thus,





2(1−α)(2−qα) is increasing in α and w(α,q) is decreasing in α. Moreover, w(ˆ α(q,0),q) =
0. Therefore, there exists αc(q) such that for α ∈ (αc(q), ˆ α(q,0)), we have π(b|w = w(α,q)) >
π(b|w = 0).
(b) q / ∈ (1
2,1) : For q ≤ 1







w ∈ [0, 1
2) since 1
2 > 1
2(1−w) > q(1−w). The buyer’s payoﬀ is π(b|w) = (1−α)2(1−2w)+
2α(1 − α)(1




(1 − w,w) if w ≤ 1 − α




1 − w if w ≤ 1 − α
1 if w > 1 − α
. The buyer’s
payoﬀ is π(b|w) = (1 − α)2(1 − 2w). Thus, the buyer’s optimal choice is w = 0 for
q / ∈ (1
2,1). ￿
Proof of Proposition 8. Let q1 = 1 and q2 ∈ (
√
5−1
2 ,1). If the buyer makes input 1
and outsources only input 2, then p∗
2(s2) = 1, in which case the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is
πMake(b) = 1− α. Suppose now that she outsources both inputs. Then, by Proposition 5, the
buyer ﬁrst negotiates for input 1, leading to an expected payoﬀ:
























Proof of Proposition 9. Let q1 = q2 = q and α1 = α2 = α. Given Proposition 2, we





α(1 − α)q if α <   α(q)
αq
1+q
















(1 − α)q + α(1 − q)1
2
 
if α <   α(q)
α
 
1 − α + α(1 − q)1
2
 







i(si|σj = b) + α1
2
 




For q ≤ 1
2, since   α(q) = 0, and p∗
i(si|σj = b) = 1
2, we have πl(si) − πf(si) = 0. Suppose
q > 1
2. If α <   α(q), then πl(si) − πf(si) = −α2(1 − q)1




26πl(si) − πf(si) = −α(1 − α)1
2 < 0. Thus, πl(si) − πf(si) < 0 if 1
2 < q <
√
5−1
2 . Now, suppose
that α ≥   α(q) and q >
√
5−1
2 . Then,   α(q) =
1−q













As mentioned in the text, all of our results would remain qualitatively the same if we assumed
a more general support for valuations. In particular, let Pr{vi = 0} = qi ∈ [0,1] and Pr{vi =
v} = 1 − qi, where v ∈ [0, 1
2]. Then, we can state the following generalization of equilibrium
characterization in Proposition 1, where v = 1
2. Since the proof is also very similar to that of
Proposition 1, we omit it here.
Proposition B1. Suppose that the buyer negotiates with supplier i ﬁrst. Then, there exists
a unique (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium and it is characterized by these prices:
(a) the buyer proposes to pay the marginal cost in both negotiations: p∗
i(b) = p∗
j(b|σ∗
i ) = 0;




1 if qi > 1 − v
1 − v if qi ≤ 1 − v,










(1,v) if αj <   α(qj,v)
(1 − (1 − qj)v,(1 − qj)v) if αj ≥   α(qj,v) and qj >   q(v)
(1 − v,v) if αj ≥   α(qj,v) and qj ≤   q(v),
where
  q(v) ≡
 
(1 − v)(1 + 3v) − (1 − v)
2v




0 if q ≤ 1 − v
1 − 1−v
q if 1 − v < q ≤   q(v)
(1 − q)v if q >   q(v),
satisfying   q(v) ∈ (1 − v,1).
Lemma B1. Suppose that unlike in our present setting, the buyer has to make her purchases
as she negotiates with the sellers, and that the purchasing history is public. Let the buyer
negotiate with seller i ﬁrst. Then, in equilibrium there is a strictly positive probability of
the buyer acquiring both goods but receiving a negative payoﬀ. In particular, the sum of




1) > 1, where φi ∈ {0,1} denotes the buyer’s purchasing decision for good i.
27Proof. Let the buyer negotiate with seller i ﬁrst, and φi ∈ {0,1} be her purchasing
decision. Then, seller j’s best response is given by
pj(sj|φi = 0) =
1
2
and pj(sj|φi = 1) =
  1
2 if ˜ qi ≤ 1
2
1 if ˜ qi > 1
2.
where ˜ qi = Pr(vi = 0|φi = 1). Next, note that if the buyer accepts a price oﬀer pi(si) by
seller i in the ﬁrst negotiation, she receives an expected payoﬀ:
max{1 − αjpj(sj|φi = 1) − pi(si),vi − pi(si)} = max{1 − αjpj(sj|φi = 1),vi} − pi(si),
whereas if she rejects pi(si), then her expected payoﬀ in the second negotiation is (1 −
αj)(1 − qj)1
2.
Comparing the two payoﬀs for the buyer, it can be seen that a price oﬀer of p
i(si) =
1 − αjpj(sj|φi = 1) − (1 − αj)(1 − qj)1
2will be accepted by the buyer with probability 1.
Therefore, in equilibrium p∗
i(si) ≥ p





i = 1) ≥ p
i(si) + p∗
j(sj|φ∗




Note that in equilibrium, p∗
i(si) must be accepted with a positive probability. Otherwise, seller
i would have a proﬁtable deviation to p
i(si) which would be accepted with certainty. Similarly,
p∗
j(sj|φ∗
i = 1) is accepted with a positive probability as well, precluding a proﬁtable deviation
by seller j to 1
2. Since, in addition, both sellers end up proposing with probability αiαj > 0,
there is a strictly positive probability that the buyer acquires both goods but realizes an ex-post
negative payoﬀ. ￿
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